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THE UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES
AUTOMATION IN POLICING

OF

Elizabeth E. Joh*
ABSTRACT
This Article has two aims. First, it explains how automated decisionmaking can produce unexpected results. This is a problem long understood
in the field of industrial organization, but identifying its effects in policing
is no easy task. The police are a notoriously difficult institution to study.
They are insular, dislike outsiders, and especially dislike critical outsiders.
Fortunately, we have the benefit of a decade’s worth of experimentation in
police use of automated decision-making and the resulting political backlash against some of these uses. As a result, some large urban police departments have undergone external investigations to see whether tools like
predictive policing or individual criminal risk assessments are biased, ineffective, or simply too costly despite their benefits. One of these recent reports, studying the use of acoustic gunshot detection software in Chicago,
provides a window into one type of police automation.
This leads to the Article’s second observation. Automation is not just a
set of tools that the police use; it changes the environment of policing in
unexpected ways. The increasing use of automated tools in policing has
generated some widely shared criticisms, but they focus primarily on the
flaws of the technologies used. The training data in facial recognition algorithms may be biased along lines of race, gender, and ethnicity. Risk assessments for gun violence may, in truth, be poor guides for police
intervention. These claims are singularly technology-focused. Accordingly,
errors and inefficiencies merit technological improvements. Even calls for
bans on technologies like facial recognition are responses to the technology
itself. As Chicago’s experience with acoustic gunshot detection technology
demonstrates, however, automation serves not just as a tool for the police,
but also leads to changes in police behavior. These changes in police conduct are documented in a 2021 report from the Chicago Office of Inspector
General, and they are noteworthy. If automation unexpectedly changes police behaviors, these changes have implications for how we understand policing through the lens of inequality and unaccountability.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A

UTOMATED decisions are a big part of police work today. The
conventional model underlying automation works something
like this: if a machine provides insight about crime, the police
apply that knowledge in their decision about where to go and what to do.
But it would be surprising if automation worked that smoothly in practice. Human beings aren’t generally known for their perfect compliance
and obedience, and police officers are no exception. Deviating from expectations about how humans use machines can provide creative solutions or create new problems. What happens when police use automation
in unexpected ways?
Raising this question matters. Two very different forces shape American policing today. One, arising from the national protests surrounding
George Floyd’s murder in 2020,1 highlights longstanding issues of racial
discrimination, unaccountability, and inequality in policing with renewed
urgency. Darnella Frazier’s decision to record Floyd’s death and post the
video on Facebook made real the disproportionate share of state violence
shouldered by Black Americans.2 A 2021 study published in the medical
journal The Lancet described this burden in stark terms.3 Researchers
estimated more than 30,000 Americans died as a result of police violence
between 1980 and 2018,4 and Black Americans were 3.5 times more likely
1. See generally Evan Hill, Ainara Tiefenthäler, Christiaan Triebert, Drew Jordan,
Haley Willis & Robin Stein, How George Floyd was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES
(May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html
[ttps://perma.cc/4LS3-6AX7].
2. See Joshua Nevett, George Floyd: The Personal Cost of Filming Police Brutality,
BBC NEWS (June 11, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52942519 [https://
perma.cc/2Y88-JGXC].
3. See Fablina Sharara & Eve E. Wool et al., Fatal Police Violence by Race and State
in the USA, 1980-2019: A Network Meta-Regression, 398 LANCET 1239, 1250 (2021), https://
www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2821%2901609-3 [https://perma.cc/
M8P9-4QGW].
4. Id. at 1239.
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to be killed by the police than Whites during that time period.5
The other important development is the increasing use of technologies
that collect and analyze massive amounts of information. Tools like predictive policing software, risk assessment instruments, and facial recognition technologies are reshaping the structures of institutions throughout
society. We see different labels for these developments, including algorithms, artificial intelligence (AI), big data, and automation. All rely on
three developments: the ability to collect and store massive amounts of
data easily and cheaply, an increase in computing power, and the development of software that analyzes and processes that data with varying
degrees of sophistication.6
The term automation is broad enough to include all these developments. In this Article, automation refers to delegating to computers aspects of decision-making previously assumed only by people.7 Some
outcomes of automation bring clear benefits, such as voice transcription
to help the disabled8 or recommendation algorithms that enhance people’s enjoyment of books, music, and films.9 But other changes have lifealtering impacts, such as whether a person is deemed hirable or
creditworthy.10 Police forces’ growing reliance on automation falls into
5. Id. at 1247 (“The police have disproportionately killed Black people at a rate of 3.5
times higher than White people, and have killed Hispanic and Indigenous people disproportionately as well.”); see also Frank Edwards, Hedwig Lee & Michael Esposito, Risk of
Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States by Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex,
116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 16793, 16793 (2019) (finding risk of fatal police violence
highest for black men, who face “about a 1 in 1,000 chance of being killed by police”).
6. DAVID G. ROBINSON & MIRANDA BOGEN, AUTOMATION & THE QUANTIFIED SO7 (2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a5e62b02aeba5a8b337504b/t/
CIETY
5a78cf2708522924c690d6db/1517866804085/Upturn-NetGain-Report-18.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MG5R-6EJF].
7. Certainly some discussions require disentangling machine learning from more
straightforward algorithms applied to historical data. See, e.g., David Lehr & Paul Ohm,
Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 660–62 (2017) (arguing that Fourth Amendment scholarship on
big data and machine learning erroneously treats machine learning as a “fully formed black
box” and “neglects the intricate processes of machine learning”). Because this Article focuses on the social and legal implications of unexpected human uses of automated
processes, however, the broad use of automation is sufficient here.
8. Joel Gershon, Otter for Accessibility—A Universal Tool That Meets Specific Needs
for People with Disabilities, OTTER.AI (June 3, 2019), https://otter.ai/blog/otter-for-accessi
bility-a-universal-tool-that-meets-specific-needs-for-people-with-disabilities [https://
perma.cc/8JFG-XBMU] (noting that the transcription app garnered a “strong response
from people with disabilities . . . , specifically many who are deaf and hard of hearing”).
9. See, e.g., How Netflix’s Recommendations System Works, NETFLIX, https://
help.netflix.com/en/node/100639?ba=SwiftypeResult
Click&q=recommendations%20system [https://perma.cc/TTX2-AUY9] (“We take feedback from every visit to the Netflix service and continually re-train our algorithms with
those signals to . . . provide you with a product that brings you joy.”).
10. See, e.g., Robert K. Yass, Homeowner’s Insurance and Credit Score: A Critical Race
Theory Perspective, 27 CONN. INS. L. J. 286, 292 (2020); Manish Raghavan & Solon Barocas, Challenges for Mitigating Bias in Algorithmic Hiring, BROOKINGS (Dec. 6 2019), https:/
/www.brookings.edu/research/challenges-for-mitigating-bias-in-algorithmic-hiring [https://
perma.cc/W2YS-AR7E].
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the latter category.11
This Article has two aims. First, it explains how automated decisionmaking can produce unexpected results. This is a problem long understood in the field of industrial organization,12 but identifying its effects in
policing is no easy task. The police are a notoriously difficult institution to
study.13 Fortunately, we have the benefit of a decade’s worth of experimentation in police use of automated decision-making and the resulting
political backlash against some of these uses. As a result, some large urban police departments have undergone external investigations to see
whether tools like predictive policing or individual criminal risk assessments are biased, ineffective, or simply too costly despite their benefits.14
One of these recent reports, studying the use of acoustic gunshot detection software in Chicago, provides a window into one type of police
automation.15
This leads to the Article’s second observation. Automation is not just a
set of tools that the police use; it changes the environment of policing in
unexpected ways. The increasing use of automated tools in policing has
generated some widely shared criticisms, but they focus primarily on the
flaws of the technologies used. For example, the training data in facial
recognition algorithms may be biased along lines of race, gender, and
ethnicity.16 Risk assessments for gun violence may, in truth, be poor
guides for police intervention.17 These claims are singularly technologyfocused. Accordingly, errors and inefficiencies merit technological improvements. Even calls for bans on technologies like facial recognition
are responses to the technology itself. As Chicago’s experience with
acoustic gunshot detection technology demonstrates, however, automation serves not just as a tool for the police but also leads to changes in
police behavior. These changes in police conduct are documented in a
11. See, e.g., Sarah Brayne, The Criminal Law and Law Enforcement Implications of
Big Data, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 293, 294 (2018) (“Law enforcement agencies are
starting to use big data in a range of daily operations and surveillance activities, including
patrol, investigation, and crime analysis.”).
12. David D. Woods & Nadine B. Sarter, Learning from Automation Surprises and
“Going Sour” Accidents, in COGNITIVE ENGINEERING IN THE AVIATION DOMAIN 1, 9 (N.
Sarter & R. Amalberti eds., 2000).
13. See, e.g., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE 997 (Jack R. Greene ed., 3d ed.
2007).
14. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. FERGUSON & DEBORAH WITZBURG, CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF
INSPECTOR GEN., THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S USE OF SHOTSPOTTER TECHNOLOGY 2 (2021) [hereinafter OIG Report], https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/
Chicago-Police-Departments-Use-of-ShotSpotter-Technology.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5SAEJWA].
15. Infra Part III.
16. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, If You’re a White Guy, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognitionrace-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/SZ5S-Z7NN] (discussing analysis by Joy
Buolamwini that found three leading face recognition systems had high rates of error—as
much as 35%—for non-White women compared to White men).
17. See generally CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., ADVISORY CONCERNING
THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S PREDICTIVE RISK MODELS 5 (2020) (outlining the
pertinent information missing from the CPD’s risk assessments).
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2021 report from the Chicago Office of Inspector General (OIG),18 and
they are noteworthy. If automation unexpectedly changes police behaviors, these changes have implications for how we understand policing
through the lens of inequality and unaccountability.
II. AUTOMATION’S EFFECTS
The increasing use of technologies to capture, store, and analyze every
movement, click, post, and transaction has become a conventional part of
ordinary policing. Whether labeled as AI or big data, these new technologies of surveillance and investigation give the police capabilities
unimaginable a generation ago. Predictive policing software identifies
persons and places associated with a high risk of criminality.19 License
plate reader systems capture and store millions of plate scans that allow
individualized tracking of people.20 Private and public sources feed millions of faces every day into databases that are scanned by law enforcement agencies.21 Both mass aerial surveillance planes and autonomous
drones can capture images useful for investigations.22 The scope of these
technologies is enormous and includes details like our faces and driving
patterns.23 One report estimates that, as of 2016, one in two American
adults has a picture stored in a facial recognition network.24 One of the
largest vendors of license plate reader data boasts that its database, accessible to law enforcement, has more than nine billion license plate scans—
more than thirty for every registered vehicle driven today.25
18. See infra Part III.
19. Tim Lau, Predictive Policing Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/predictive-policing-explained
[https://perma.cc/N3XA-5HSC].
20. Angel Diaz & Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Automatic License Plate Readers: Legal
Status and Policy Recommendations for Law Enforcement Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-license-plate-readers-legal-status-and-policy-recommendations [https://perma.cc/Z496CBGH].
21. One of the largest providers of facial recognition technology to police, Clearview
AI, “has scraped billions of publicly available images from websites like YouTube and
Facebook, and enables customers to upload photos of individuals and automatically match
them with other images and sources in the database.” Nicol Turner Lee & Caitlin Chin,
Police Surveillance and Facial Recognition, BROOKINGS (Apr. 8, 2022), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/police-surveillance-and-facial-recognition-why-data-privacyis-an-imperative-for-communities-of-color [https://perma.cc/ML57-RAQS].
22. See, e.g., Curt Fleming, Remote Drone Dispatch: Law Enforcement’s Future?, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (2019), https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/remote-drone-dispatch
[https://perma.cc/D572-W5WR].
23. See, e.g., Diaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 20.
24. CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO M. BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, GEORGETOWN L.
CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org [https://perma.cc/W635B5CB]. Additionally, the Georgetown Law Center on Privacy and Technology refers to the
fact that sixteen states allow the police to run searches against driver’s licenses and ID
photo databases. Id.
25. Byron Tau, License-Plate Scans Aid Crime-Solving But Spur Little Privacy Debate,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/license-plate-scans-aid-crimesolving-but-spur-little-privacy-debate-11615384816 [https://perma.cc/DG6T-E9CD].
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Although these technologies represent enormous leaps of scale and capability, they also have continuities with past practices. Surveillance is an
essential aspect of modern society.26 Policing, in particular, has always
needed methods of collecting, sorting, and deriving insights from information. What is distinctive about today’s automation, however, is its ease,
breadth, and depth. Whether collected directly or indirectly by the police,
data can be captured easily, kept indefinitely, and assessed repeatedly.
Not only do these new tools permit the police to collect and assess data
about individuals and populations, they do so with low effort.27 Neither
facial recognition software nor license plate readers need human intervention. Their automated matches are routinized and automatic.28
Earlier studies on automation can provide a great deal of insight here.
We know that the introduction of automated systems into any field can
bring “unanticipated problems and failures.”29 A key observation from
the field of industrial organization is that technology cannot be understood in isolation from the people tasked with using it.30 This is true of
airline pilots as well as factory machine operators. When automated
processes arrive in the workplace, a common misunderstanding is that
these tools will increase speed and efficiency but will otherwise leave
other systems and actors unaffected.31 This “substitution myth” is not
borne out in reality.32 Automation brings with it transformative changes.
Sometimes unintended consequences occur in automation because
there is a gap between how the developers envision people using their
systems and how the systems work in real life.33 Automating processes
can lead to changes that are “qualitative and context-dependent” in the
workplace.34 For example, early autopilot programs revealed some surprises. Developers designed the systems to improve safety by having ma26. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 57–58 (1990)
(“[The] administrative concentration [necessary for a capitalist society] depends in turn
upon the development of surveillance capacities well beyond those characteristic of traditional civilisations, and the apparatuses of surveillance constitute a third institutional dimension associated, like capitalism and industrialism, with the rise of modernity.”); DAVID
LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 33 (1994) (“The rise
of the ‘surveillance society,’ then, is inextricably bound up with the growth of the modern
nation-state.”).
27. See Gary T. Marx, What’s New About the “New Surveillance”? Classifying for
Change and Continuity, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 8, 11 (2002) (noting that much modern
surveillance is remote and low effort).
28. See Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOCIO.
REV. 977, 979 (2017) (“Whereas traditional surveillance is inductive, involving the ‘close
observation, especially of a suspected person,’ . . . and relying on the unaided senses, new
surveillance is more likely to be applied categorically, deductive, remote, low visibility or
invisible, involuntary, automated, preemptive, and embedded into routine activity.”).
29. N.B. Sarter, D.D. Woods & C.E. Billings, Automation Surprises, in HANDBOOK OF
HUMAN FACTORS & ERGONOMICS 1, 1 (Gavriel Salvendy ed., 2d ed. 1997).
30. See Woods & Sarter, supra note 12, at 9.
31. See Sarter, Woods & Billings, supra note 29, at 1 (“The assumption was that new
automation can be substituted for human action without any larger impact on the system in
which that action or task occurs, except on output.”).
32. Id.
33. See id. at 2.
34. Id. at 3.
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chines assume some of a pilot’s tasks,35 but their designs did not always
take into account how pilots might interact with their machines. New machines introduced complexity by requiring tasks that pilots had not performed before.36 Pilots did not understand some of the new processes and
thus ignored them as a result.37 Automated flight deck systems may not
work as intended if they do not take into account actual air traffic control
patterns and pilots’ varying preferences.38 Automation in flight was not
merely a substitute for the work of a human being; it changed the process
of flying a plane and the pilots themselves in unexpected ways.
Also relevant here is the repeated observation that we all rely heavily
on mental shortcuts. We lean on strategies to simplify our decision-making rather than engage in full and thorough assessments.39 Without these
simplifications, even ordinary decision-making would be exhausting. In
terms of social psychology, we are “cognitive misers.”40 When confronted
with complex problems, people tend to adopt cognitive shortcuts that emphasize efficiency, even if these solutions are incorrect, biased, or less
than optimal.41 The result is that our decision-making processes favor
simplicity over comprehensiveness and speed over reflection. Legal scholars have used the cognitive miser framework to help explain recurring but
troubling instances of decision-making, including how racial bias can influence decisions about force and suspicion.42
In short, policing itself is being transformed by processes that have not
just expanded the surveillance capabilities of the police but have automated many processes once considered essentially human, like judgments
about suspicion and recognition of persons. We also know that automation does not simply lighten work burdens by substituting machines for
human labor. Automation can produce surprising and sometimes unwanted effects. This means that people may face new and unexpected
complexities when automation enters their workplace. When confronted
with complex systems of automation, we can reasonably expect people to
take mental shortcuts to make quick decisions in the ways they always
have. The results may be surprising, novel, and complicated in unanticipated ways.
35. See id. at 1.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 4.
38. See id. at 2.
39. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 13 (Christopher
Rogers & Fred H. Burns eds., 2d ed. 1991).
40. Id. The social psychologists Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor are credited with coining the term “cognitive miser,” which had broad applications to a variety of fields. See, e.g.,
The Loop, Comminucation Impediments: Are You a Cognitive Miser?, FICKEWIRTH, https://
www.fickewirth.com/the-loop-detail.php?Communication-Impediments-Are-You-a-Cognitive-Miser-111 [https://perma.cc/5MVW-ZGG8] (noting that Fiske and Taylor created the
term and applying it to work communications among teams).
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion
Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 298–314 (2012) (describing how misleading mental shortcuts can produce “suspicion heuristics”: intuitive judgments about criminality or threats
that also lead to racially biased perceptions).
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III. AUTOMATION’S EFFECTS ON POLICING: SHOTSPOTTER
Police behavior is notoriously difficult to study. As an occupational
group, police are insular and distrustful of outsiders—especially critical
outsiders.43 Thus, whether and how automation works in policing will
likely be a difficult topic to study. With police automation, oversight
mechanisms have achieved some transparency. A handful of large, urban
police departments have undergone reviews by local inspectors general.44
This Part reviews the findings of Chicago’s experience with acoustic gunshot technology, as evaluated by the Chicago Inspector General in 2020.
A. CHICAGO, POLICE,

AND

SHOTSPOTTER

Violent crime and racially disparate policing have been a persistent
problem in Chicago for more than fifty years, although its realities are
somewhat different than national headlines imply.45 Chicago does not
lead the nation in murder, as some have suggested.46 But while crime
rates fell in Chicago (and in other major American cities) from the 1990s
to the 2010s, violent crime remains a problem.47
Crime is not evenly distributed across all communities.48 Instead, crime
visits neighborhoods of “concentrated” violence in Chicago: places where
violence is matched by entrenched “forms of disadvantage, from poverty
to segregation, to joblessness.”49 Low-income, majority-Black neighborhoods experience disproportionately higher rates of homicide in Chicago
than their wealthier, Whiter counterparts.50 As sociologist Patrick
Sharkey has observed of Chicago, “[t]he overall level of violence has fluc43. See, e.g., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 13, at 997 (“As an
outsider group, the patrol officers’ occupational identity and subculture crystallize, wherein
isolationism, secrecy, strong in-group loyalties, sacred symbols, common language, and a
profound estrangement from the larger society intensify.”); cf. Richard V. Ericson, Patrolling the Facts: Secrecy and Publicity in Police Work, 40 BRIT. J. SOCIO. 205, 211 (1989)
(“The police have a particular bent toward reticence and secrecy.”).
44. See, e.g., OIG Report, supra note 14; MARK P. SMITH, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
REVIEW OF SELECTED LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT DATA-DRIVEN POLICING
STRATEGIES 1 (2019), https://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/031219/BPC_19-0072.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39VF-YQKH].
45. President Trump famously—and erroneously—described Chicago’s violence problem as “worse than Afghanistan.” Lynn Sweet, At Police Event, Trump Calls Lefty Chicago
‘Worse Than Afghanistan,’ Says—Again—‘We’re Not Going to Let It Go On,’ CHI. SUNTIMES (July 13, 2020, 8:31 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/columnists/2020/7/13/
21323563/police-event-trump-calls-lefty-chicago-worse-than-afghanistan-threatens-not-going-let-it-go-on [https://perma.cc/C74Q-WKZN].
46. John Gramlich & Drew Desilver, Despite Recent Violence, Chicago Is Far From the
U.S. ‘Murder Capital,’ PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/11/13/despite-recent-violence-chicago-far-from-u-s-murder-capital [https://
perma.cc/3YHM-YH2X] (“Chicago is by no means the nation’s ‘murder capital.’ For decades, in fact, it has had fewer murders per capita than many other U.S. cities with smaller
populations, according to FBI data going back to 1985.”).
47. Patrick Sharkey & Alisabeth Marsteller, Neighborhood Inequality and Violence in
Chicago, 1965–2020, 89 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 349, 350 (2022).
48. See id. at 349.
49. Id. (citations omitted).
50. See Robert J. Sampson & Brian L. Levy, The Enduring Neighborhood Effect, Everyday Urban Mobility, and Violence in Chicago, 89 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 323, 326 (2022).
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tuated, but the distribution of violence has been remarkably
consistent.”51
The police in Chicago have tried many different approaches. In 1992,
the city council adopted the Gang Congregation Ordinance in response
to rising rates of murder and violent crime. The ordinance permitted officers to arrest individuals who failed to disperse after the police identified them as “criminal street gang members” loitering in a public place
“with no apparent purpose.”52 In 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down the city’s Gang Congregation Ordinance.53 The Court acknowledged that the ordinance was designed to address illegal drug sales and
intimidation of city residents by gang members, but it nevertheless “afford[ed] too much discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens
who wish to use the public streets.”54 Though the initial ordinance was
deemed unconstitutionally vague, the city council passed a new ordinance
in 2000 that addressed the Court’s concerns.55
Fast forward a few decades and we can see that the tools used by the
Chicago police, like police everywhere, are considerably different. In
2018, the city of Chicago entered into a three-year, thirty-three million
dollar contract for services with an acoustic gunshot detection technology
company called ShotSpotter.56 Like many technological tools used today
by the police, the relationship between the Chicago Police and ShotSpotter is that of customer-vendor.57 In theory, acoustic gunshot technology is
designed to help police identify more gunshot incidents and respond to
them more quickly.58 Research suggests that gun violence is severely underreported.59 Thus, acoustic gunshot detection technology is intended to
51. Sharkey & Marstellar, supra note 47, at 361. Regarding increasing violent crime
rates since the 2010s, Sharkey finds, “The overall increase in murders between 2014 and
2020 has disproportionately affected Black residents.” Id. at 370.
52. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 47 (1999).
53. See id. at 50–51 (1999).
54. Id. at 64.
55. Dirk Johnson, Chicago Council Tries Anew With Anti-Gang Ordinance, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/22/us/chicago-council-tries-anewwith-anti-gang-ordinance.html [https://perma.cc/V8S8-GVTR].
56. OIG Report, supra note 14, at 2. That contract makes the city of Chicago the
company’s largest customer. See Garance Burke, Martha Mendoza, Juliet Linderman &
Michael Tarm, How AI-Powered Tech Landed Man in Jail With Scant Evidence, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 5, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/artificial-intelligence-algorithmtechnology-police-crime-7e3345485aa668c97606d4b54f9b6220 [https://perma.cc/BBP5KC8W] [hereinafter AP Report].
57. WGN Web Desk & Kelly Davis, OIG Report: ShotSpotter Rarely Leads to Evidence of Gun-Related Crime, Changes Police Behavior, WGN-TV (Aug. 24, 2021 5:53 PM),
https://wgntv.com/news/chicago-news/oig-report-shotspotter-rarely-leads-to-evidence-ofgun-related-crime-changes-police-behavior [https://perma.cc/A8CR-X44Z] (“We work
very closely with our agency customers to ensure they get maximum value out of our
service.”).
58. See Reduce Gun Crime With Proven Gunshot Detection Technology, SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com/law-enforcement/gunshot-detection/#what-is-shotspotter
[https://perma.cc/SHA8-Q382].
59. See JILLIAN B. CARR & JENNIFER L. DOLEAC, THE GEOGRAPHY, INCIDENCE, AND
UNDERREPORTING OF GUN VIOLENCE: NEW EVIDENCE USING SHOTSPOTTER DATA 2
(2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Carr_Doleac_gunfire_
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identify many more incidents for police response that would otherwise go
unreported.
ShotSpotter describes its technology as having “automated the process” of identifying gunshots.60 Its service uses both mounted hardware in
public spaces and AI at its corporate offices.61 The company’s acoustic
sensors, placed throughout a city, listen for gunshots.62 Any potential
gunshot sound is transmitted from the sensors to ShotSpotter, where machine learning algorithms classify the sound.63 ShotSpotter’s human analysts are then supposed to either reject or confirm the identified sounds as
gunshots and not, for instance, fireworks.64 An alert confirming that a
probable gunshot has been detected is then sent to the client’s police department in a minute or less.65
More than a hundred cities in the United States have entered into contracts with the publicly-traded company for these services.66 The subscription fees ShotSpotter charges cities for its services range from
$65,000 to $95,000 per square mile per year.67 These commercial relationships typify the growing police reliance on private sector tools that local
governments neither use nor completely control.68 ShotSpotter contracts
often state that the firm, not the municipal customer, owns the data.69
The company also claims that the data it generates from its acoustic gunshot sensors are proprietary trade secrets.70 This corporate secrecy has
made it difficult to access the data supporting the company’s claims.71
underreporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FF8-L7WH] (“Using data from Washington, DC,
and Oakland, CA, we find evidence of severe underreporting of gun violence.”).
60. ShotSpotter, How ShotSpotter Gunshot Detection Works—English (updated Aug
2021), YOUTUBE (Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NK980tdlzFI [https://
perma.cc/Y2MF-7VDA].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Reduce Gun Crime With Proven Gunshot Detection Technology, supra note 58.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See ShotSpotter Cities, SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com/cities [https://
perma.cc/5XAS-3BKG] (listing the cities in which ShotSpotter is doing business).
67. See ShotSpotter Fact Sheet, SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com/system/
content-uploads/ShotSpotter_Fact_Sheet_-_final_draft_12.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y8R9PP2].
68. In its early days, cities purchased the equipment and monitored it themselves, but
today ShotSpotter is a subscription service offered to municipalities. See Erica Goode,
Shots Fired, Pinpointed and Argued Over, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/us/shots-heard-pinpointed-and-argued-over.html [https://
perma.cc/L73L-SA3M].
69. Jennifer L. Doleac, To Reduce Gun Violence, Empower Citizens to Make Their
Communities Safer, BROOKINGS (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/to-reduce-gun-violence-empower-citizens-to-make-their-communities-safer [https://perma.cc/
TYH8-GN4H].
70. See id.
71. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1284
(2020) (“ShotSpotter—and some municipalities—took the position that, pursuant to contract, the data was not a matter of public record.”); see also Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty,
and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1343, 1366 (2018) (discussing a California case in which “the court . . . endorsed ShotSpotter’s legal theory of the trade secret privilege in criminal proceedings”); see also Elizabeth
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In Chicago, gunshots detected by ShotSpotter display as alerts on the
ShotSpotter application available to employees of the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC), analysts at the police
department’s Strategic Decision Support Centers, and on-duty officers
who have the ShotSpotter mobile app on their work-issued
smartphones.72 Chicago Police Directives instruct officers responding to
ShotSpotter alerts to look for victims, evidence of a crime, or any potential suspects at the scene.73
Every single ShotSpotter alert becomes a data point. Chicago OEMC
employees assign a unique number for each alert and then dispatch officers to respond.74 After officers respond to the alert, the primary police
unit is required to report the outcome to the OEMC.75 The disposition
code assigned to the outcome of the case depends on whether the event is
considered a criminal incident or a non-criminal one.76 Chicago Police
Directives also require that officers who conduct investigatory stops in
response to a ShotSpotter alert record that unique event number as part
of the stop’s recorded information.77 All this coding means that ShotSpotter alerts themselves become recorded data that can be aggregated
and analyzed, as well as cross-referenced with other records like police
stops and arrests that may be related.78
In 2021, the Public Safety section of the Chicago OIG began an inquiry
into the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD) use of ShotSpotter technology.79 Its investigation focused on all ShotSpotter alert notifications between January 1, 2020, and May 31, 2021, as well as all investigatory stops
associated with a ShotSpotter alert within the police department’s crossreferencing system.80 The OIG’s final report, issued in August 2021, provided both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the department’s
ShotSpotter use.81
The sheer number of alerts generated by ShotSpotter is noteworthy.
During the seventeen-month period under review, the OIG identified a
total of 50,176 ShotSpotter alerts as “probable gunshots” with unique
identifier numbers.82 Every single one of these alerts resulted in a police
response to the location identified by the company’s alerts.83 The OIG
also found 1,056 police investigative stops associated with ShotSpotter
Joh & Thomas Joo, The Harms of Police Surveillance Technology Monopolies, DENV. L.
REV. F. 1, 8 (Apr. 4, 2022) (“The privately developed and controlled nature of these products and services has proven to be a challenge to police oversight and regulation.”).
72. See OIG Report, supra note 14, at 7.
73. See id. at 8.
74. See id. at 2–3.
75. See id. at 9.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 11.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 2.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 2–3.
83. Id.
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alerts, as illustrated in Figure 1.84 In other words, the required documentation associated with these stops shared event numbers with particular
ShotSpotter alerts.85
Also notable is the geographic distribution of alerts. Almost a quarter
of all alerts—11,903 unique events—were concentrated in two CPD districts: the Fourth and Fifth.86 These areas, located in the south and southeastern portions of the city, also coincide with neighborhoods that are
both low-income and majority Black or Hispanic.87 Other analyses have
suggested that ShotSpotter sensors tend to be concentrated in urban communities of color rather than distributed evenly throughout a city.88
/^ZηϬ
ϬϬϰϵϰϭϵϭϰ
sEdηϭϰϰϱϭ͘tZKZ/E/Ed͘/E^hDDZz͕ͬKΖ^tZZ^WKE/E'dK
^,Kd^WKddZK&KEZKhEKEd,^/K&d,h/>/E'K&ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐͬKΖ^ϰϵ
K^ZsƐƵďũĞĐƚ;K&&EZͿt><Khd&ZKDd,^/K&d,h/>/E'dĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ͘
ͬKΖ^KEhdE/Es^d/'dKZz^dKWK&d,K&&EZdKs>Kd/KEͬ͘K
K^Zs>Z'h>'/Ed,K&&EZΖ^<WK<dE&ZKEdWK<dͬ͘KΖ^
d,EWZ&KZDWZKdd/sWdKtEK&^h:dE&KhEEKWEϮϰKE
K&ǭǭ^d>Z^Zsǭǭ>K,K>/Ed,K&&EZΖ^<WK<d;/EsηŶƵŵďĞƌͿͬ͘K
&KhE^D>>'>^^Kdd>d,dWWZdK,sE&^,/KE/EdKZh'
WZW,ZE>/;/EsηŶƵŵďĞƌͿ/EK&&EZ^&ZKEdWK<d͘K&&EZZ>d,h^^
d,/^K:d^W/WdK^DK<Z<ͲK/Eͬ͘KΖ^W>K&&EZ/EdKh^dKz
EWZ&KZDEZKd/^^Z,K&d,K&&EZͬ͘KZKsZ^D>>
&K>W/K&t,/dWWZKEd/E/E't,/dWKtZZK<Ͳ>/<^h^dE
^h^WdZ<K/E;/EsηŶƵŵďĞƌͿ͘K&&EZZ>ddKͬKΖ^d,dd,
^h^dEt^^D>>DKhEdK&Z<ͲK/E͘K&&EZdZE^WKZddKϬϬϰd,
/^dZ/dzƵŶŝƚ&KZWZK^^/E'͘

Figure 1: Narcotics Arrest Following Response to ShotSpotter Alert89
The Chicago OIG’s assessment of the police department’s use of acoustic gunshot detection technology is withering. Out of the total number of
alerts, Chicago police officers found evidence of gun-related criminal of84. Id. at 3.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 13. The current boundaries of the Fourth and Fifth police districts can be
found at Boundaries—Police Districts (current), CHI. DATA PORTAL, https://
data.cityofchicago.org/Public-Safety/Boundaries-Police-Districts-current-/fthy-xz3r [https://
perma.cc/3SM6-VMB8].
87. The MacArthur Justice Center conducted a study using census data to determine
the percentage of residents in each Chicago police district who identify as Hispanic or
African American. See Brief of Amici Curiae Chicago Community-Based Organizations
Brighton Park Neighborhood Council, Lucy Parsons Labs, and Organized Communities
Against Deportation at 12–16, State v. Williams, No. 20-CR-0899601 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2021),
https://www.macarthurjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Motion-for-Leave-to-FileBrief-as-Amici-Curiae-with-Ex.-A-Amicus-Brief-Attached.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3NX4BNJ] [hereinafter MacArthur Report].
88. See Todd Feathers, Gunshot-Detecting Tech Is Summoning Armed Police to Black
Neighborhoods, VICE (July 19, 2021, 9:17 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/88nd3z/
gunshot-detecting-tech-is-summoning-armed-police-to-black-neighborhoods [https://
perma.cc/H7V3-3VZJ] (finding that in Chicago, Kansas City, Cleveland, and Atlanta, “the
data shows that the sensors are also placed almost exclusively in majority Black and brown
neighborhoods, based on population data from the U.S. Census”).
89. OIG Report, supra note 14, at 18. “A/O’s” refers to arresting officers.
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fenses just 4,556 times—representing only 9.1% of all police responses to
ShotSpotter alerts during the review period.90 In addition, just 1,056 investigatory stops were associated with unique ShotSpotter event numbers,91 representing a mere 2.1% of all police responses to ShotSpotter
alerts.92 The OIG summarized its finding: “CPD responses to ShotSpotter
alerts rarely produce documented evidence of a gun-related crime, investigatory stop, or recovery of a firearm.”93 Police use of ShotSpotter in
Chicago “had no significant impact on firearm-related homicides or arrest
outcomes.”94
While gunshot detection technology offers the theoretical benefit of
quicker police response times and more efficient law enforcement, the
OIG report on its use in Chicago raises the stark question of whether the
tool is justifiable. The very existence of the technology has costs, including the “financial resources, the time and attention of CPD members, and
the risk that CPD members dispatched as a result of a ShotSpotter alert
may respond to incidents with little contextual information about what
they will find there.”95 The report did not have any immediate effect.
When the Chicago OIG published its findings, the CPD had already exercised its option to extend its original $33 million contract with the company.96 The new contract expires on August 19, 2023.97
Media coverage of the OIG report focused on the unproven efficacy of
the technology. News outlets said the Chicago OIG’s “scathing report”98
revealed that the Chicago Police had adopted an expensive, “ineffective
tool.”99 The report’s findings were similar to a May 2021 analysis of Chicago’s ShotSpotter use conducted by the MacArthur Justice Center at
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law.100 The MacArthur study analyzed
a slightly different time period—July 1, 2019, to April 13, 2021—but came
to a similar conclusion. In their review of data obtained from Chicago’s
OEMC, of the 46,743 police responses prompted by a ShotSpotter alert
during the review period, the vast majority—85.6%—yielded no evidence
90. See id. at 3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 6.
95. Id. at 22.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id.
98. Tom Schuba & Fran Spielman, City’s Watchdog Finds ShotSpotter Rarely Leads to
Evidence of Gun Crimes, Investigatory Stops, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Aug. 24, 2021), https://
chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2021/8/24/22639473/shotspotter-chicago-police-inspectorgeneral-report-gun-crimes-evidence-shootings [https://perma.cc/9LFS-8MQ8] (“The city’s
top watchdog issued a scathing report . . . .”).
99. See, e.g., Julia Marnin, Chicago’s ShotSpotter System Deemed an Ineffective Tool
for Gun-Related Crime: Watchdog, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 24, 2021, 1:30 PM), https://
www.newsweek.com/chicagos-shotspotter-system-deemed-ineffective-tool-gun-relatedcrime-watchdog-1622627 [https://perma.cc/6G95-9FKD].
100. See MacArthur Report, supra note 87, at 25–26.
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of a crime or any other reportable incident by the responding officers.101
These “dead-end” responses by the police102 were not evenly distributed
across the city. By matching the locations of ShotSpotter alerts with census data, the MacArthur Justice Center found that, during its review period, the technology was “deployed in the [twelve] districts with the
highest proportion of Black and Latinx residents and the lowest proportion of White residents.”103
ShotSpotter’s response to the Chicago OIG report is founded on a
claim it has made before: its official statement reported that “[t]he OIG
report does not negatively reflect on ShotSpotter’s accuracy which has
been independently audited at 97[%] based on feedback from more than
120 customers.”104 ShotSpotter claims that its technology can identify
gunshots with “97% accuracy,” but the company does not offer evidence
from independent studies to support this claim.105 Nor has the company’s
proprietary algorithm ever been peer-reviewed by independent researchers.106 A 2011 investigation by ShotSpotter found that the technology can
both miss gunfire close to its sensors and produce false positives by misclassifying sounds like backfiring cars and fireworks as gunshots.107
Even if the technology was accurate, its ability to reduce gun violence
is unclear.108 ShotSpotter itself claims that its product leads to increases
101. See id. at 10. The Report also found that an even smaller percentage—10.28%—of
all ShotSpotter alerts during the period resulted in police reporting an incident about a
firearm. Id. According to the report, “[t]he difference between these two figures reflect
incidents where police respond to a ShotSpotter alert but end up stumbling upon some
other reportable incident.” Id.
102. See id. at 4, 12–16 (“In reality, the ShotSpotter system produces an astonishing
number of dead[ ]ends: alerts of gunfire that turn up no evidence of gunfire, according to
the police’s own classification of each incident.”).
103. Id. at 13–14.
104. WGN Web Desk & Davis, supra note 57.
105. See About ShotSpotter, SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com/company
[https://perma.cc/S4CQ-2Y56] (claiming “97% Accuracy (aggregate across all customers
2019–2020)”); see MacArthur Report, supra note 87, at 4 (“The company has never provided validated studies to back up its astonishing claim of ‘97% accuracy’ or 0.5% false
positives.”); see also Todd Feathers, Police Are Telling ShotSpotter to Alter Evidence From
Gunshot-Detecting AI, VICE (July 26, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/
qj8xbq/police-are-telling-shotspotter-to-alter-evidence-from-gunshot-detecting-ai [https://
perma.cc/LR7B-AUMD] (quoting a ShotSpotter employee’s court testimony about the accuracy rate as “put together by our sales and marketing department, not our engineers”);
Are Gunshot-Detecting Microphones Worth the Money?, ECONOMIST (Dec. 4, 2021), https:/
/www.economist.com/united-states/2021/12/04/are-gunshot-detecting-microphones-worththe-money [https://perma.cc/S46F-CKEF] (observing of ShotSpotter that “there is little independent evidence that it reduces crime overall”).
106. See AP Report, supra note 56.
107. See id. Some police departments have ended their use of ShotSpotter because of
disappointing results. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Crowe II, Troy Will Turn Off ShotSpotter,
TIMES UNION (Oct. 30, 2012, 11:11 PM), https://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Troywill-turn-off-ShotSpotter-3994808.php [https://perma.cc/FZ4H-JRQ6] (quoting police chief
as saying that system was “unreliable” and “expensive”).
108. Mitchell L. Doucette, Christa Green, Jennifer Necci Dineen, David Shapiro &
Kerri M. Raissian, Impact of ShotSpotter Technology on Firearm Homicides and Arrests
Among Large Metropolitan Counties: A Longitudinal Analysis, 1999–2016, 98 J. URB.
HEALTH 609, 619 (2021) (“Despite minimal evidence-based peer-reviewed research, Shot-
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in arrests and reductions in violence,109 but these claims are not based on
peer-reviewed studies. By contrast, researchers in 2022 examined ShotSpotter uses in sixty-eight large counties from 1999 to 2016 and found no
difference in homicides, murder arrests, and weapons arrests between
those large metropolitan counties that used the technology and those that
did not.110
Even more troubling are reported cases in which ShotSpotter’s own
analysts have testified in court that they reclassified sounds as gunshots at
the request of their police customers—a practice that one employee said
“happens all the time.”111 A reclassified ShotSpotter alert was the key
evidence police relied upon to arrest Michael Williams in 2021.112 Williams told the police that someone in another car shot at him after he
picked up an acquaintance in the South Side neighborhood of Chicago on
May 31.113 The bullet hit the car’s passenger, who died two days later.114
The state’s case against Williams hinged mainly on a ShotSpotter alert
identifying a shooting at the intersection where the victim had been
shot.115 Prosecutors interpreted this alert, along with a surveillance video
of Williams running a red light, to mean that Williams had shot the victim.116 Evidence from the pretrial hearing showed that the ShotSpotter
algorithm had identified the noise as a firework with 98% confidence.117
A company employee relabeled the noise as a gunshot.118 A judge ultimately dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence, but not before
Williams spent eleven months in jail.119
These findings on the results of CPD’s ShotSpotter use are important.
They caution skepticism toward this expensive policing technology—one
that might fall well short of its promises about reducing violence and improving police responses. But more broadly, these findings contribute to
Spotter technology has been implemented throughout the USA, with more than 100 cities
implementing the technology since it was made commercially available in the mid-2000s.”).
109. Contributing to Positive Outcomes, SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com/results [https://perma.cc/NJ37-23NH].
110. Doucette, Green, Dineen, Shapiro & Raissian, supra note 108, at 616. But see LORRAINE G. MAZEROLLE, JAMES FRANK, DENNIS ROGAN & CORY WATKINS, A FIELD EVALUATION OF THE SHOTSPOTTER GUNSHOT LOCATION SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT ON THE
REDWOOD CITY FIELD TRIAL ii (1999), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/180112.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M94Z-SR39] (finding in Justice Department-funded study that technology was able to detect nearly 80% of test shots).
111. See AP Report, supra note 56 (reporting testimony of ShotSpotter engineer Paul
Greene in 2016 New York state case).
112. See id. The following facts are taken from the AP investigation.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. Throughout that weekend, some people in Chicago used fireworks in protests responding to George Floyd’s murder. See Feathers, supra note 105.
118. See AP Report, supra note 56.
119. See id. ShotSpotter issued a lengthy response to the AP and asserted that “the
injustices borne from this incident will only be perpetuated if lies are permitted to cover up
the facts.” See ShotSpotter’s Response to Associated Press Article, SHOTSPOTTER (Aug. 26,
2021), https://www.shotspotter.com/law-enforcement/shotspotter-response-to-associatedpress-article [https://perma.cc/3ZJD-ZDUG].
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a growing body of scholarship and activism that questions the implementation of “tech solutionism” to address complex structural problems of
violence, poverty, and disadvantage that no single technological tool can
solve.120
B. SHOTSPOTTER’S AUTOMATION SURPRISE
Another observation in the Chicago OIG review of Shotspotter’s technology drew less attention but was equally important. Although the OIG
report was able to match ShotSpotter alerts to 1,056 stops conducted by
the police because they shared the same event number, the report also
found some unanticipated information. This Section describes these findings that are buried in the database of police stop reports and explains
their importance in the growing automation of policing.
1. Terry Stops and Investigative Stop Reports in Chicago
If police officers have a “reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot,”121 they may temporarily detain an individual through a
Terry stop.122 Every Chicago police officer who conducts a Terry stop
must complete an investigatory stop report (ISR).123 The ISR includes
details about the person stopped and the facts supporting the officer’s
reasonable suspicion.124 Officers must also include the relevant ShotSpotter event number when one is associated with the stop.125 This system
permitted the OIG to query the Chicago ISR database to find event numbers matching the ShotSpotter alerts identified during the review
period.126
In theory, every police stop in Chicago must produce a recorded narrative about the encounter. The OIG searched the narratives of the ISR
database to see if other nonstandard information could be discovered
120. Evgeny Morozov identifies and critiques the idea of tech solutionism: the idea that
social problems can be solved with the development of the right technologies. See EVGENY
MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM 259 (2013); cf. Doucette, Green, Dineen, Shapiro & Raissian, supra note 108, at
616 (“Unlike public policies that take time and political will to implement, ShotSpotter is
available for purchase, and its implementation is dictated by a municipality’s willingness to
pay.”). The global pandemic has also accelerated some kinds of tech solutionism. See AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING SYSTEMS IN THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
(2020), https://algorithmwatch.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ADMsystems-in-the-Covid-19-pandemic-Report-by-AW-BSt-Sept-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C7PC-6D4W] (noting pervasiveness of “‘technological solutionism,’ a flawed ideology that
conceives of every social problem as a ‘bug’ in need of a ‘fix’ through technology, . . . even
in the face of scant evidence”).
121. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 119 (2000).
122. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court articulated the standard for brief investigatory detentions. 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
123. See OIG Report, supra note 14, at 11.
124. See Investigatory Stop Report, CHI. POLICE DEP’T, https://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-11.910.pdf [https://perma.cc/59BP-2S9Y]. The police officer must have facts that support more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or ‘hunch.’” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
125. See OIG Report, supra note 14, at 11.
126. See id.
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about ShotSpotter use.127 By searching for the terms “SPOTTER” or
“SST,” the OIG found an additional 1,366 ISRs that did not match any of
the more than 50,000 ShotSpotter event numbers during the review period.128 The OIG reviewed a sample of this other set of police stop narratives—72 of the 1,366—for further review.129
Some portion of these reports were likely due to recordkeeping issues.
Based on their review of these nonstandard references to ShotSpotter,
the OIG found that approximately 18% of the seventy-two reports sampled could in fact be traced to an existing ShotSpotter alert.130 These
were stops that should have been initially cross-referenced with an existing ShotSpotter alert but were not, either out of inadvertence or otherwise. But another set of these reports reveal an unexpected pattern that
mere quantitative analysis of the official ShotSpotter reports would have
missed.
2. “Changing Police Behavior”
Among the seventy-two randomly sampled stop reports that did not
match known ShotSpotter alerts but did refer to the technology, the OIG
identified ten reports where police officers referred to the “aggregate results of the ShotSpotter system as informing their decision to initiate a stop
or their course of action during the stop, even when they were not responding to a specific ShotSpotter alert.”131 In other words, some police
officers justified stop and frisks not because they were responding to a
specific alert, but because they were in an area they believed to be the
site of previous alerts.
For example, one ISR referred not to a specific ShotSpotter alert but
more generally to “multiple bonafide [sic] ShotSpotter events in the
area” where the individual stopped had been observed as part of the basis
for the stop.132

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 11–12.
See id. at 12.
See id.
See id. at 19.
See id.
Figure 2, infra note 133.
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/^ZηϬ
ϬϬϴϵϵϰϳϴϭ
sEdηϬϴϭϯϱt/Eh^͘ZͬKΖ^tZKEWdZK>/E,/',Z/DZt/d,Dh>d/W>
KE'K/E''E'EEZKd/KE&>/d^͕^W/&/>>zEKE'K/E''E'tZ
dtEŐĂŶŐEŐĂŶŐͬ>^K͕Dh>d/W>KE&/^,Kd^WKddZsEd^/Ed,
Z͘͘d,/^Z/^WZ/KZ/dzKEηϮ/Ed,ϬϬϳd,/^dZ/d͘ZͬKΖ^dhZE^ͬKEƐƚƌĞĞƚ
&ZKDƐƚƌĞĞƚ͘ZͬKΖ^K^Zst,Kd,ZͬKΖ^EKt<EKt^ƐƵďũĞĐƚ>KK</EZͬKΖ^
/Zd/KE͕'Z,/^t/^dE͕E'EdK^</WdKtZ^d,&ZKEdKKZK&d,
Z^/EĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ͕&KZ&h>>^WZ/Ed/E'/EdKd,Z^/E͘ƐƵďũĞĐƚd,EEdZ
^/Z^/E͘ZͬKΖ^d,E'EdKdKhZd,Z/Ed,t^d>>zKEd,
ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶEƐƵďũĞĐƚ;K&&EZͿd,EDZ'&ZKDd,'E'tzdĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ͘ZͬK
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌd,E's,^EƐƵďũĞĐƚ;K&&EZͿKEd/EhdK&>͘ZͬKŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ
KEd/Eh,^/E'K&&EZ͕dt,/,d/DƐƵďũĞĐƚ;K&&EZͿ:hDW&E
E><&/ZZD&>>&ZKD,/^WZ^KE͘ƐƵďũĞĐƚ;K&&EZͿd,EW/<^/
&/ZZD<hWEKEd/EhdKZhE͘W͘KŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ's/Zd/KEK&&>/',ds/
KDZ/KEZͬKŽĨĨŝĐĞƌt^>dKhdK&&EK^ZsƐƵďũĞĐƚ;K&&EZͿ
d,ZKt><&/ZZDKEdKd,ZKK&dĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ͘ZͬKŽĨĨŝĐĞƌt^>dKW>
ƐƵďũĞĐƚ;K&&EZͿ/EdKh^dKzt/d,Khd/E/Ed͘ZͬKΖ^ZYh^d&dZh<ϰϭ
dKZdZ/sd,&/ZZD&ZKDd,ZKK&͘&/ZZDZKsZzKhDEdKEt͘
ZͬKΖ^ZKsZϭ>K>h^d>D^dZW/ZD^DW&EZϵDDt/d,
ϰ͘ϱ/E,ZZ>>z/>/E'^Z/>ηŶƵŵďĞƌ͕dd,t^><,/',W/dz
D'/Et/d,Dh>d/W>>/sZKhE^;/EsηŶƵŵďĞƌͿ͘ZͬKΖ^d,EdZE^WKZd
ZZ^ddKd,ϬϬϳd,/^dZ/d&KZ&hZd,ZWZK^^/E'͘^h^YhEdED,<
Zs>d,ZZ^dK^EKdWK^^^^>ϱϮEKZ&K/͘ED,<>Z͘
ZZ^d/^^>&ͲD/ddŐĂŶŐ͘EKd&>KE͘EKtEd^ͬtZZEd^ͬ/Ζ^͘'hE^<
EKd/&/tWKE/^>ZEKdZ'/^dZWZŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ͘

Figure 2: “multiple bonafide [sic] ShotSpotter events in the area”133
Other reports also relied on “ShotSpotter results in the aggregate” to
justify frisks of the persons who had been stopped.134 One officer justified
an investigatory stop in part because of being “on patrol in an area
known for its high volume of ShotSpotter notifications.”135 Another officer justified a frisk of an individual in part “due to many ShotSpotter
alerts . . . in the proximity,” leading him to “reasonably believe[ ]” that a
large weighted object in the subject’s front hoodie pocket was possibly a
firearm.136 Only one of the ten sampled reports that reference ShotSpotter as a general justification, not tied to a particular alert, resulted in an
arrest.137

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
2).

OIG Report, supra note 14, at 20 [hereinafter Figure 2].
Id. at 19.
Figure 3, infra note 138.
Figure 4, infra note 139.
See OIG Report, supra note 14, at 19 (referring to the report reproduced as Figure
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/^ZηϬ
ϬϭϬϭϱϭϭϳϭ
sEdηϭϯϱϭϲ͘t/E/Ed͘ZͬKΖ^KEWdZK>/EEZ<EKtE&KZ/d^,/',
sK>hDK&^,Kd^WKddZEKd/&/d/KE^EWZ^KEt/d,'hE>>͘/Ed,d͕t,/>
KEWdZK>ZͬKΖ^K^Zsd,Ks^dds,/>WZ<dd,Ks^dd
Z^^DKZd,EϭϮ/E,^&ZKDd,hZt,/,/^s/K>d/KEKK&DϵͲ
ϲϰͲϬϮϬ;Ϳ͘ZͬKhd/>/,/^hEDZ<WK>/s,/>^WKd>/',dE^,/EEƐŝĐ/d
dKtZ^d,t/E^,/>K&d,Ks^dds,/>͘/dt^dd,/^d/D͕ZͬK
K^ZsDͬϭE<Ks^h:d^d/Ed,&ZKEdW^^E'Z^d͘ZͬKd,E
EKd/d,Ks^h:dZ,dKtZ^d,EdZK&,/^t/^d>/EE'E
dK:h^dd,dKWWZdK&,/^WEd^͘/E/d/KE͕ZͬKd,EK^Zsd,Ks
^h:dE,/^hWWZKz&KZtZh^/E'Kd,K&,/^ZD^dKEKEs/^/>͘
ZͬKy/d,/^WK>/s,/>EWWZK,d,WZ<s,/>&ZKDd,
W^^E'Z^/E'EdKKDDhE/dt/d,d,Ks^h:d͘ZͬKZYh^d
&ZKDd,Ks^h:ddKWZKs/WZKK&K&/Ed/&/d/KEdt,/,d/D,
&/>dKWZKs/KE͘t,/>KDDhE/d/KEt/d,d,Ks^h:d͕ZͬK^D>>
EKKZK&>K,K>/sZ'D/dd/E'&ZKDd,s,/>EEKd/d,Ks
^h:d^,E^dKdZD>͘^KEZͬKΖ^yWZ/E/EEhDZKh^tWKE^
s/K>d/KEZZ^d^͕ZͬKZ^KE>z>/sd,Ks^h:dt^/EWK^^^^/KE
K&&/ZZD͘ZͬKZYh^dd,Ks^h:ddKy/dd,s,/>&KZ&hZd,Z
/Es^d/'d/KE͘hWKEK/E'^K͕ZͬKWZ&KZDWZKdd/sWdKtE^KEd,
<EKtEs/K>EdZEKs^h:d^^h^W//Kh^,s/KZ:h^d/E't/^d
>/E͕E/E'hWWZKz&KZtZ͕EdZD>/E',E^͘E'd/sZ^h>d^K&Ez
tWKE^͘d,Ks^h:dd,EZ>ddKZͬKd,dd,Zt^Kdd>K&
>K,K>/Ed,s,/>Ed,d,,EZ/E</E'͘ZͬKΖ^WZ&KZD^Z,
K&d,s,/>&KZd,WK^^//>/dzK&EzKWEKEd/EZ^K&>K,K>/Ed,
s,/>͘ZͬKΖ^/^KsZKdd>K&KhZsK/^/Z>K,K>/sZ't/d,
ZK<E^>>KdKEd,&>KKZKZ/E&ZKEdK&d,ZZW^^E'Z^d͘
ED,<K&Ks^h:d>Z͘Ks^h:dt^'/sEsZ>tZE/E'
Et^Z>^t/d,Khd/E/Ed͘Ks^h:dZ&h^E/^ZZ/Wd͘

Figure 3: “In an area known for its high volume of ShotSpotter
Notifications”138

138. Id. at 21 [hereinafter Figure 3].
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ϬϭϭϭϬϮϳ
ϳϲϳ
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d/D͘d,ZKh',Khdd,/^sEd͕^h:dt^sZzsZ>>z''Z^^/sz
KEd/EhKh^>zz>>/E'dZͬK^E>>/E'ZͬK^K^E/d/^͘^h:dZ&h^E/^Z
Z/WdEd,^dKWt^KE>ht/d,Khd/E/Ed͘

Figure 4: “Due to many ShotSpotter alerts”139
Quantitative analysis alone would have missed these surprising results
and would have underrepresented “the extent to which the introduction
of ShotSpotter technology in Chicago has changed the way CPD members perceive and interact with individuals present in areas where ShotSpotter alerts are frequent.”140 Although the OIG reviewed only 72 of
the 1,366 reports that referred to ShotSpotter but were not associated
with a specific alert, it concluded that “some officers, at least some of the
time, [were] relying on ShotSpotter results in the aggregate to provide an
additional rationale to initiate stop or to conduct a pat down once a stop
has been initiated.”141
According to the company’s materials, ShotSpotter is not meant to be
used this way. As one of the company’s promotional videos explains, if a
gun is fired in an area where sensors are located, the information for a
particular suspected gunshot is sent to the company for analysis.142 The
identification of a probable gunshot is then routed to the police, who can
be dispatched to the scene “to engage the shooter, interview witnesses,
and collect key evidence at the crime scene.”143 In other words, ShotSpotter is intended to be used for the identification of specific gunshots to
help police with more rapid and efficient responses.
C. WHY AUTOMATION SURPRISES MATTER

IN

POLICING

We should not dismiss this subset of stop reports as instances where a
technological tool has been misused or misunderstood by the police.
These unexpected uses of ShotSpotter reveal how automation can change
the act of policing in unexpected ways, rather than simply providing the
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 21–22 [hereinafter Figure 4].
Id. at 19.
Id.
See ShotSpotter, supra note 60.
Id.
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police with an additional tool. The technology has changed the way some
police officers “perceive and interact with individuals present in areas
where ShotSpotter alerts are frequent.”144 The broad assumption that
certain places were associated with gunshot detection alerts was “substantively changing police behavior” in Chicago.145 These were not police responses to specific incidents of probable gunshots. Automation changed
police behavior through its very existence.146
Assuming that ShotSpotter would simply swap out human eyes and
ears for machines is an example of the “substitution myth.” In reality, the
introduction of automation can “transform[ ] practice[s].”147 To be sure,
the technology often did work as intended: alerts led to police responses
in places where probable gunshots had been detected tens of thousands
of times. But it also created an unintended cognitive shortcut: the mere
awareness that certain neighborhoods had been associated with a high
but unspecified number of alerts became an indicator of suspiciousness.
No official directive told officers whether a certain number of alerts over
a specific period of time in a particular place could help justify characterizing a person found there as suspicious. Yet these generalized references
to the technology’s alerts became a “fact” used to help justify a stop or
frisk.148
Recall that OIG’s conclusion was based on its quantitative analysis of
more than 50,000 alerts.149 Chicago’s protocols, which send a police response to every ShotSpotter alert, “rarely produce evidence of a gun-related crime, rarely give rise to investigatory stops, and even less
frequently lead to the recovery of gun crime-related evidence during an
investigatory stop.”150 In other words, the total number of ShotSpotter
alerts yielded very few investigative successes for the police.
Individual officers did not, of course, make these calculations when
they referred to a place as a site of multiple prior alerts. Instead, they
made their own quick judgments that certain areas were subject to multiple alerts and therefore would help justify a Terry stop, frisk for weapons,
or both. This was an unexpected consequence of introducing this particular form of automation into police work—one that changed police officers’ perceptions and behavior in the neighborhoods they patrolled and
the people they encountered.151
144. OIG Report, supra note 14, at 19.
145. Id. at 22.
146. See ROBINSON & BOGEN, supra note 6, at 19 (“[A]utomation and quantification
change the things they touch.”).
147. Sarter, Woods & Billings, supra note 29, at 21.
148. Id. at 2 (noting that surprises can occur when automation is based upon “designers[’] assumptions about intended rather than actual use of automation”).
149. See text accompanying supra note 82.
150. OIG Report, supra note 14, at 22.
151. Id. at 3 (“[I]ntroduction of ShotSpotter technology in Chicago has changed the
way some CPD members perceive and interact with individuals present in areas where
ShotSpotter alerts are frequent.”).
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Identifying such effects matters for several reasons. First, the ShotSpotter example demonstrates how human discretion can creep into automated decision-making. Inferring that a large number of alerts means a
place is dangerous and people found within it could pose dangers to the
police is not an intended use of the technology. Both ShotSpotter and the
CPD presume police responses that are premised on specific alerts. Yet as
the OIG Report uncovered, officers in Chicago used what they assumed
about ShotSpotter alerts in the aggregate to justify Terry stops.152 Under
some conditions, such assumptions might be justified. One can imagine a
block or a set of blocks where multiple alerts did yield evidence of gun
violence on repeated occasions. But the surprising reports identified by
the Chicago OIG did not reference any particular number of alerts in any
particular time frame. “Many ShotSpotter alerts” became shorthand for
officers’ belief that an area was generally dangerous whether or not it
actually was dangerous.
Perhaps such intuitions are no different than a sense that a neighborhood is a “high crime area.” Courts permit the police to rely on such
determinations as part of the justification for a stop. After all, the Supreme Court permitted such a broad statement to be part of the reasonable suspicion calculus, and in a case arising in Chicago, no less.153 If the
two justifications are similar, however, we can level the same critiques at
them. That a place is a “high-crime area . . . is hardly ever empirically
supported with factual evidentiary proof” yet is repeatedly accepted by
courts as a valid factor for reasonable suspicion.154 And as legal scholars
have pointed out, the “high-crime” designation often results in discriminatory policing in low-income communities of color.155
ShotSpotter’s application in Chicago raises the concern that it is left
entirely up to individual officers whether and how to use these generalized references to multiple alerts. Individual officer decisions about
whether or not a neighborhood is a site of multiple aggregate alerts are
only vaguely data-driven at best, and those discretionary choices can increase the potential for violence at the hands of the police. Every individual ShotSpotter alert dispatches a police response to an area where there
may be an armed individual, and the perception that an area is associated
with multiple alerts can influence police decision-making on the scene

152. See supra Section III.B.2.
153. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“[W]e have previously noted the
fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.”) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972)).
154. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable
Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1591 (2008).
155. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 677–78 (1994) (“African Americans and Hispanic Americans make up almost all of the population in most of the neighborhoods the
police regard as high crime areas.”).
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about potential threats and whether to resort to force.156
Second, the way ShotSpotter unexpectedly altered police behavior in
Chicago has ramifications elsewhere. ShotSpotter itself claims that at
least 120 cities around the country have contracted for its services.157 If
the behavior of Chicago police officers has been changed by the use of
ShotSpotter, we should expect similar behavior in these other cities. We
can also apply the insights from Chicago to other police technologies besides acoustic gunshot detection. Consider predictive policing software,
which analyzes historical crime data and other factors to predict which
locations are more likely to be sites of criminal offenses in the future.158
Like ShotSpotter, predictive policing programs are designed to direct
specific responses to individual forecasts about crime and place. Just as in
Chicago, however, individual police officers in a department using predictive policing might rely not only on specific alerts but also on generalized
assessments that certain neighborhoods, blocks, or locations are sites of
previous predictions in the aggregate. A reference to “multiple predictive
alerts” associated with a place may become part of the justification an
officer uses for an investigative detention or frisk of a person encountered there. That same approach might also be used in future applications, like ongoing live facial recognition that looks for wanted persons.
All of these represent unexpected consequences of police using technology that leads to highly discretionary decision-making.
Moreover, these discretionary uses are at odds with the rhetoric of
these technologies: assertions about precision techniques that represent
the cutting edge of AI in policing.159 The Deputy Director of the CPD
responded to the OIG Report’s findings by emphasizing the “real-time
alerts of detected gunfire enabling patrol officers to arrive at a precise
location of a shooting event quickly.”160 Police reliance on a generalized
assertion that a place has been subject to multiple ShotSpotter alerts in
the past may not be so different from calling it a “high-crime neighborhood.”161 Yet there is a difference. Police chiefs describe ShotSpotter as a
156. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ford, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 712, 714 (Mass App.2022) (noting
that officer responding to ShotSpotter alert approached defendant and “unholstered his
firearm but kept it in the ‘low, ready position,’ pointed at the ground”).
157. Company Overview, SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.shotspotter.com/company [https:/
/perma.cc/FE4L-TFY2].
158. For a detailed description of predictive policing, see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 265–85 (2012).
159. Cf. Tom Schuba & Fran Spielman, City’s Watchdog Finds ShotSpotter Rarely Leads
to Evidence of Gun Crimes, Investigatory Stops, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Aug. 24, 2021), https://
chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2021/8/24/22639473/shotspotter-chicago-police-inspectorgeneral-report-gun-crimes-evidence-shootings [https://perma.cc/D9DR-W9Z2] (quoting
Chicago City Council Committee on Public Safety Chairman as saying CPD cannot afford
to be “left behind” when other big city departments “are moving toward more technologybased policing”); State v. Gayle, No. A-0575-14T4, 2017 WL 1034442, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Mar. 17, 2017) (quoting police explanation of ShotSpotter as a system “used for
snipers in Iraq to pinpoint a sniper. We use it now in the city to pinpoint firearms”).
160. WGN Web Desk & Davis, supra note 57.
161. See text accompanying supra notes 153–54.
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technological “game-changer,”162 but in reality, it can obscure the use of
very human, discretionary (and flawed) decision-making.163
If police are incorporating automated decision-making into their own
ordinary discretionary choices, then we can apply familiar tools of analysis. “American police have always had a great deal of discretion.”164
Judges, legislators, and scholars have explored how to exercise that authority and what restraints should be imposed upon it for more than sixty
years.165 Why does it matter to identify and understand automation in
policing as an issue of police discretion? It matters because issues of discretion can be readily understood and addressed. They are neither novel
nor require highly technical knowledge. These are ordinary and persistent
problems in policing.166
Third, traditional Fourth Amendment law is unlikely to say much about
tools like ShotSpotter, even as it appears to change police perceptions
and behavior. The required Fourth Amendment standard for stop-andfrisk searches is reasonable suspicion, which the Supreme Court has explained involves “commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with
‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’”167 Legal scholars have
widely criticized the standard as so vague as to be virtually meaningless,
thus permitting almost entirely discretionary stops, particularly against
communities of color.168 Indeed, the Court’s analysis in Terry acknowledges the limited ability of courts to rein in police conduct concerning
162. AP Report, supra note 56 (“Police chiefs call ShotSpotter a game-changer.”).
163. See Brayne, supra note 28, at 982 (“[A]lthough part of the appeal of big data lies in
its promise of less discretionary and more objective decision-making, . . . new analytic
platforms and techniques are deployed in preexisting organizational contexts . . . .”).
164. Alice Ristroph, What Is Remembered, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1157, 1168 (2020).
165. The “discovery” of police discretion is usually attributed to the pioneering study of
the American Bar Foundation in the 1950s, which turned conventional thinking about the
police “on its head.” See GEORGE L. KELLING, NAT’L INST. JUST., “BROKEN WINDOWS”
AND POLICE DISCRETION 21–23 (1999), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178259.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/6VE4-3XJX]. That discovery spawned a robust body of research by sociologists,
criminologists, and legal academics. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal
Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REV. 703, 706 (1974) (“Police discretion is absolutely
essential. It cannot be eliminated. Any effort to eliminate it would be ridiculous. But unnecessary police discretion can and should be eliminated, and necessary discretion can and
should be controlled—can and should be properly confined, structured, and checked.”).
166. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 543 (1960) (observing that decisions of police discretion “not to invoke the criminal process . . . are generally of extremely low visibility” and yet their review “is essential to the functioning of the
rule of law in our system of criminal justice”).
167. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 231 (1983)).
168. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 975, 1022 (1998) (observing that Terry stops have permitted police targeting of racial
minorities); Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1054–55 (1998) (observing that Terry
v. Ohio’s standard “is a mess”).
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encounters on the street.169
Courts have begun to decide cases involving ShotSpotter alerts, and the
emerging picture suggests that even a single alert can be part of the reasonable suspicion calculus.170 In a 2020 decision, the Seventh Circuit concluded that ShotSpotter was “analogous to an anonymous tipster” and
that two alerts, along with other factors, were sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for a stop.171 In 2022, a Massachusetts appeals court
held that the police’s stop and frisk search of a defendant was supported
by reasonable suspicion, based in part on a ShotSpotter alert.172 The
court noted that police reliance on ShotSpotter did not depend on the
technology’s “reliability as an indicator of ‘actual’ gunshots, but merely
an indicator of ‘potential’ gunshots, i.e., noises that could be gunshots.”173
Instead, the alerts are akin to an “acoustic trail of breadcrumbs,” permitting the inference that the individual the officer encountered might be
connected to the possible gunshot detected.174
Technological tools like ShotSpotter, including predictive policing forecasts, are unlikely to alter how courts view the Fourth Amendment. Andrew Ferguson posits that courts will likely consider predictive policing
forecasts legitimate factors supporting investigative stops.175 Courts will
likely view a single alert, multiple alerts, and perhaps even nonspecific
references to multiple prior alerts similarly contributing to a totality of
the circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion. Accepting these new
types of information may tell us more about the “malleability” of reasonable suspicion than anything else.176
Finally, Chicago’s experience with acoustic gunshot detection technology suggests that these tools may yield few benefits in crime prevention
or investigation while also resulting in continued patterns of discriminatory policing. To summarize, the evidence from Chicago suggests that the
vast majority of alerts yielded no evidence of crime—whether related to
guns or otherwise—yet also sent police officers who believed they may be
169. See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Patrol, Judicial Integrity, and the Limits of Judicial Control, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1353, 1359 (1988) (“The [Terry] Court recognized that
police engage in abusive conduct in street encounters for purposes wholly unrelated to any
legitimate interest in investigating crime or keeping the peace . . . [and] admitted that its
decision was unlikely to stop such behavior.”).
170. See, e.g., People v. Pope, 194 A.D.3d 449, 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) (finding existence of reasonable suspicion based in part on “ShotSpotter report[ing] that numerous
shots had been fired at a particular location”).
171. United States v. Rickmon, 952 F.3d 876, 882, 885 (7th Cir. 2020). The appeals court
did note in dicta, “[W]e question whether a single ShotSpotter alert would amount to reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 881; see also United States v. Jones, 1 F.4th 50, 53 (D.C. Cir.
2021) (finding reasonable suspicion for Terry stop did exist based in part on ShotSpotter
alert where police encountered defendant).
172. Commonwealth v. Ford, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 712, 719 (Mass. App. 2022).
173. Id. at 719 n.8.
174. Id. at 717.
175. Ferguson, supra note 158 at 312 (“While never enough alone, with some relevant
corroboration, a predictive tip will serve as the basis of a constitutional stop. . . . [T]he
weight of predictive policing in the totality has the potential to be significant.”).
176. See id.
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encountering someone armed with a gun to majority Black and Hispanic
neighborhoods, sometimes dozens of times a day.177 Although police responding to a technological alert may be novel, residents in these neighborhoods may experience familiar patterns of policing—officers deployed
to the same neighborhoods multiple times a day expecting volatile situations. With ShotSpotter alerts, responding officers have a “system telling
[them] that anybody in the area is a mortal threat.”178 These deployments
can lead to more stops, frisks, tense encounters, and the potential for mistaken perceptions on the part of police or civilians that can lead to unnecessary violence. Relying on generalized and nonspecific views on
previous alerts provides police with more latitude to justify these decisions. This increase in the amount and degree of tension and potentially
deadly interactions with the police can exacerbate community alienation
from the police.179
What results are increased possibilities for stop-and-frisks for those
who are already subject to intensive policing practices in the city of Chicago. A 2015 study reported that, during 2014, residents of Chicago were
subjected to police stops “more than four times as often as New Yorkers
at the height” of that city’s controversial stop and frisk policies from 2002
to 2013.180 A review of police stops in Chicago conducted over a fourmonth period revealed that 72% of those stopped were Black residents,
who account for just 32% of the city’s population.181 When viewed
against the findings of both the Chicago OIG and the MacArthur Justice
Center, these statistics reveal increased risks without clear public
benefits.
In Chicago, these risks have a special significance. The Justice Department’s 2015 investigation of the CPD found that the city’s predominantly
Black and Hispanic neighborhoods “experience policing in a fundamentally different way than do [W]hite individuals and [W]hite communi177. Cf. MacArthur Report, supra note 87, at 2 (“On an average day in Chicago, the
ShotSpotter system sends police out on more than sixty dead-end searches for gunfire.”).
178. Feathers, supra note 88.
179. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126
YALE L.J. 2054, 2107–08 (2017) (“Legal estrangement, emerging out of personal and vicarious experiences, serves as a lens through which many African Americans interpret past
and future engagements with law enforcement officials.”).
180. STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO, ACLU OF ILL. 2 (Mar. 2015), https://www.acluil.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S9Z9-MBSC]. The ACLU Report led to a 2015 settlement with the city that required increased data collection and reporting by the Chicago Police. See INVESTIGATORY
STOP AND PROTECTIVE PAT DOWN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, ACLU OF ILL. 2, 4, 8 (Aug.
6, 2015), https://www.aclu-il.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-08-06Investigatory-Stop-and-Protective-Pat-Down-Settlement-Agreeme. . . .pdf [https://
perma.cc/36DF-BMBK]. The high number of stops conducted by the NYPD slowed after
Mayor Bill de Blasio agreed to reforms ordered by Judge Shira Scheindlin in Floyd v. City
of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See Benjamin Weiser & Joseph
Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-andfrisk.html [https://perma.cc/JZQ9-F3QP].
181. STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO, supra note 180, at 8.
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ties.”182 Residents of majority Black and Hispanic neighborhoods felt
that their communities were simultaneously over-policed and under-policed. Tactics like “jump-outs,” in which police randomly paused their patrol cars and opened their doors to see if residents would run, and
repeated stops, interviews, and searches of young people made some
communities’ members feel like they lived in “an open-air prison”
guarded by “an occupying force.”183 At the same time, victims of crime in
these same neighborhoods expressed views that the police were unsympathetic to their concerns and took few concrete steps to solve homicides.184
In 2019, a federal judge approved a consent decree for policing reforms
after the state’s attorney general sued for reforms based on the Justice
Department’s report.185 In 2021, the independent monitor of the consent
decree found that the Chicago Police had failed to comply with 120 of 315
requirements and had failed to meet 26 out of 43 agreed-upon
deadlines.186
IV. CONCLUSION
The increasing role of AI in policing has an understandable appeal to
the police; it promises high-tech solutions to address criminal investigations faster and more efficiently. Yet this new technology may fail to deliver on these promises and introduce new, unanticipated complications.
Automation in policing will not merely serve as a substitute for human
tasks or perform those tasks more quickly. It can also change policing
behaviors. Evidence from the use of acoustic gunshot detection technology in Chicago provides one such extended example. The major finding
of the OIG was significant: the ShotSpotter technology rarely led officers
to the evidence of gun violence it was designed to detect. Instead, some
police began to rely on more generalized references to past alerts. The
CPD case study highlights a longstanding problem of police discretion
that the application of new technology should not obscure, and it also
182. INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts.
Div. 139 (Jan. 13, 2017), http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/
01/DOJ-INVESTIGATION-OF-CHICAGO-POLICE-DEPT-REPORT.pdf [https://
perma.cc/59WU-GV5U].
183. Id. at 143.
184. Id. at 140, 142.
185. Consent Degree Documents, CHI. POLICE CONSENT DECREE, http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/resources [https://perma.cc/9SP6-XFW7].
186. See INDEPENDENT MONITOR FILES THIRD REPORT ASSESSING THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S REFORM EFFORTS, INDEP. MONITORING TEAM (Mar. 31, 2021),
https://cpdmonitoringteam.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021_03_31-News-Release-Independent-Monitoring-Report-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNP5-A277]; INDEPENDENT MONITORING REPORT 3, INDEP. MONITORING TEAM 9–10 (Mar. 30, 2021), https://
cpdmonitoringteam.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2021_03_30-Independent-Monitoring-Report-3-amended-filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/D49A-F9B4]; Frank Main & Fran
Spielman, City Blew 40% of Police Consent-Decree Deadlines Last Year; Lightfoot Points
to ‘Substantial Progress,’ CHI. SUN-TIMES (Mar. 31, 2021), https://chicago.suntimes.com/
2021/3/31/22360397/chicago-police-department-missed-40-percent-consent-decree-deadlines-lightfoot-substantial-progress [https://perma.cc/KG3D-4VSY].

534

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

raises new questions about the unanticipated ramifications of new police
technologies across the law enforcement spectrum.

